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ASSESSING THE BARRIERS TO UNIVERSAL 
ANTIRETROVIRAL TREATMENT ACCESS FOR 
HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
MARY BETH WALKER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An estimated 5.3 to 5.6 million South Africans are living with 
HIV/AIDS, more than in any other country.1  The adult infection rate is ap-
proximately 21 percent.2  Of the 5 million people living with HIV/AIDS 
estimated 230,000 are children under the age of 15.3  In 2003 alone, ap-
proximately 96,228 babies (about 250 per day) were infected with HIV 
through mother-to-child transmission (MTCT).4  HIV disease attacks the 
immune system, and particularly focuses on CD4 (T-cell helpers) cells.5  
CD4 counts in a healthy adult usually fall within the range of 800 to 1200.6  
As HIV attacks the CD4 cells, this count drops.  Once a person’s CD4 
count falls below 200, the HIV-infected person becomes most susceptible 
to other infections.7  Eventually, if left untreated, HIV develops into AIDS.  
Because of its attack on the body’s immune system, AIDS leaves a person 
nearly indefensible against illness.  These illnesses will lead to certain 
death.  Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment has proven successful at signifi-
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 1. UNAIDS, 2004 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 190 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 
REPORT]; DEP’T OF HEALTH, REPORT, NATIONAL HIV AND SYPHILIS ANTENATAL SERO-PREVALENCE 
SURVEY IN SOUTH AFRICA 10 (2003) [hereinafter ANTENATAL SURVEY].  UNAIDS estimates the num-
ber of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS at 5.3 million.  2004 REPORT, supra, at 190.  UNAIDS 
also provides a range of the number of infections with a low of 4.5 million South Africans infected to a 
high of 6.2 million South African infected.  Id.  The South African Department of Health estimates that 
5.6 million South Africans were infected by the end of 2003.  ANTENATAL SURVEY, supra, at 10. 
 2. UNAIDS, 2004 UPDATE: EPIDEMIOLOGY FACT SHEETS ON HIV/AIDS AND SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS – SOUTH AFRICA 2 (2004). 
 3. Id. 
 4. ANTENATAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 10. 
 5. Whitman-Walker Clinic, HIV/AIDS Basics, at http://www.wwc.org/hiv_aids_services/ 
technical_information.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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cantly slowing the progression of HIV to AIDS.8  However, as of 2003, 
less than one percent of the South African HIV-infected population had ac-
cess to antiretroviral treatment.9 
This note will examine the recent and continuing struggle to wide-
spread access to ARV treatment in South Africa in the contexts of both in-
ternal infrastructure and drug costs due to patent protection.  Much has 
been written about the effects of the world patent system on access to 
HIV/AIDS medication in developing countries.10  Particular attention has 
been paid to South Africa, in large part due to its 1997 Amendment to the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act and the uproar that law 
caused among major pharmaceutical companies.11  A patent system that 
addresses the needs of HIV-infected South Africans in light of the tremen-
dous costs of ARVs is certainly part of any long-term solution for provid-
ing ARV treatment on a widespread basis.  However, I argue in part that 
neither the cost of medication nor the current global patent system has been 
the only, or indeed the most pressing problem facing South Africa’s fight 
for widespread state distribution of ARV medication.12  Basic domestic in-
frastructure and the government’s delayed response to the crisis have 
played a larger role in delaying widespread distribution of ARVs.  The first 
part of this note will examine these domestic issues.  The second half of the 
note will then look at avenues for addressing the next step in the access cri-
sis—how to secure affordable, safe ARVs for the treatment of HIV disease. 
II.  DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING ACCESS TO ARVS 
A. Income Levels and Medical Costs 
At the end of 2003 the World Bank estimated the average per capita 
gross national income (GNI) in South Africa at US$2,780.13  Within South 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. UNAIDS, ACCELERATING ACTION AGAINST AIDS IN AFRICA 60 (2003) (listing South Africa 
among many African countries whose coverage rate for ARV treatment in 2003 is less than 1 percent). 
 10. See generally Srividhya Ragavan, Can’t We All Get Along?  The Case for a Workable Patent 
Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117 (2003). 
 11. See John Jeter, Trial Opens in South Africa AIDS Drug Suit, WASH. POST, March 6, 2001, at 
A1, for a brief overview of the case.  For more in-depth coverage of the case see Mark Heywood, De-
bunking ‘Conglomo-talk’: A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an Instrument for Advocacy, Investi-
gation and Mobilisation, presented at The Health, Law and Human Rights: Exploring the Connections 
Conference  (Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Heywood, Debunking ‘Conglomo-talk’]. 
 12. Clearly, cost plays an important role in access to ARVs. It will be discussed further infra at 
Part II. 
 13. WORLD BANK, World Development Indicators Database–South Africa (2004), available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
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Africa this translates to the buying power of INT$10,270.14  The cost of 
ARVs can exceed US$10,000 per patient, per year. 15  Clearly this cost 
plays a role in the limited access HIV-infected South Africans have to the 
medications. 
In a 1999 survey published by the Kaiser Family Foundation only 19 
percent of South Africans reported full private health coverage.16  The 
choice to use private health facilities, where most of the country’s health 
resources are allocated, was largely determined by whether a person had 
access to private health coverage.17  This trend was particularly pronounced 
when comparing public and private hospitals.  Patients with private health 
coverage accounted for 85 percent of those seen at private hospitals while 
only four percent of patients visiting public hospitals paid via private health 
coverage.18  South Africans reported cost as the main reason for not seek-
ing medical attention when needed.  In the survey, 66 percent of the re-
spondents cited their inability to afford medical care as the reason they 
failed to get treatment.19 
B. The Fight for Government Support 
In recent years South Africans have been fighting an uphill battle with 
the government on the appropriate response to the AIDS crisis.  South Af-
rican President Thabo Mbeki received world-wide criticism for his public 
questioning of both the causal link between HIV and AIDS and the effec-
tiveness of ARVs in treating HIV.  In October 1999, both Mbeki and “his 
health minister disputed the safety and effectiveness of AZT, a standard 
drug used to block transmission of HIV from mother to child.”20  Mbeki 
 
 14. Id.  This data is based on purchasing power parity of international dollars which are defined as 
having the same purchasing power over gross national income as the purchasing power of US$1 within 
the United States.  Id. 
 15. Barton Gellman, S. African President Escalates AIDS Feud; Mbeki Challenges Western 
Remedies, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at A1; see also infra Part II. 
 16. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., The Second Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Health 
Care in South Africa ii (1999),  available at http://www.kff.org/southafrica/loader.cfm?url=/ 
commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=13242 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND.]. 
 17. See id. at iii; see also Law and Treatment Access Unit of the AIDS Law Project & Treatment 
Action Campaign, The Price of Life 31 (2003). 
 18. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 16, at iii. 
 19. Id. at 19. 
 20. Henri E. Cauvin, South African Retreats from AIDS Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at 
A14; see also Mark Heywood, Current Developments: Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission 
in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign Against the 
Minister of Health, 19 S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 278, 281–83 (2003) (describing the relationship between 
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again entered the public debate about AIDS in 2000 by assembling a task 
force that included experts who denied the causal link between HIV and 
AIDS.21  In a letter written to world leaders, including then U.S. President 
Bill Clinton, Mbeki defended his actions by equating criticism of his inclu-
sion of these scientists in the discourse on the AIDS crisis in South Africa 
to the “racist apartheid tyranny” previously present in the country.22  
Though Mbeki later retreated from these positions in the wake of public 
criticism, he went only so far as to say that South Africa’s efforts to fight 
AIDS would be “based on the ‘thesis’ that HIV causes AIDS.”23 
It was against the backdrop of this public and prolonged debate that 
South Africa began to address the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the country 
with two distinct but important achievements.  The first was the February 
2000 release by the Department of Health of a comprehensive Strategic 
Plan detailing the South African AIDS epidemic and proposals for respond-
ing to the crisis.24  In addition to reporting statistical information about the 
epidemic and acknowledging the huge scale of the spread of HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa, the report was “designed to guide the country’s response as a 
whole to the epidemic” for five years.25  The Plan detailed issues to be ad-
dressed regarding effective implementation of a national program to com-
bat the AIDS epidemic.  Included were goals to improve structures of de-
livery, to address the issue of human resources, and to establish acceptable 
standards of funding.26 
Access to ARVs was addressed in Goal 11 of the Plan’s 15 goals.27  
Included in this goal were three objectives: 
(1) “Review and revise policy on anti-retroviral use for reducing 
mother-to-child HIV transmission.” 
(2) “Conduct research on the cost-effectiveness of other forms of 
non-retroviral treatment and prophylaxis.” 
(3) “Conduct research on the effectiveness of traditional medi-
cines.”28 
 
 
“AIDS denial” and the derailment of a national program to prevent MTCT of HIV) [hereinafter Hey-
wood, Current Developments]. 
 21. Cauvin, supra note 20, at A14. 
 22. S. African President Addresses AIDS in Africa, WASH. POST [Online Edition], April 19, 2000, 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40387-2000Apr18 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 23. Cauvin, supra note 20, at A14. 
 24. See generally, MINISTER OF HEALTH, HIV/AIDS/STD STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
2000-2005 (2000). 
 25. Id. at 5–6. 
 26. Id. at 26–7. 
 27. Id. at 22. 
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Strikingly, even though it was published in 2000, the report lacked refer-
ence to any objective encompassing research on or development of ARV 
medication outside the context of MTCT.29 
The second achievement, which was aggressively fought but eventu-
ally conceded by the South African government, was the outcome of a 
Constitutional Court battle in favor of wider distribution of the ARV drug 
Nevirapine for use in prevention of MTCT.30  Without any intervention the 
MTCT rate is 35 percent.31  Transmission of the virus during pregnancy 
and during labor and delivery process accounts for 65 percent to 70 percent 
of infections transmitted from mother to child.32  The normal course of 
treatment with Nevirapine—a single dose to the mother during delivery fol-
lowed by a single dose to the child within 72 hours of birth—can reduce 
transmissions during pregnancy, labor and delivery by 50 percent.33 
Results from a study conducted by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) demonstrated the efficacy of Nevirapine as early as 1999.34  The ef-
fectiveness of single-dose Nevirapine was further backed by the release of 
preliminary results of the South African Intra-partum Nevirapine Trial 
(SAINT) in 2000.35  Also in 2000, the manufacturer of Nevirapine, Boe-
hringer Ingelheim, partnered with the United Nations to offer the drug free 
of charge to developing countries, including South Africa, for five years.36  
Despite this offer, the government “reacted coolly to the preliminary an-
nouncement of the SAINT results.”37  South Africa’s Medicines Control 
Council (MCC) approved registration of Nevirapine for the ‘prevention of 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See generally, Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2), 2002 (5) SALR 721 
(CC); Heywood, Current Developments, supra note 20 (documenting litigation challenging the South 
African government’s policy of limiting provision of Nevirapine for the prevention of MTCT to pilot 
sites). 
 31. UNICEF, FACT SHEET, MOTHER-TO-CHILD TRANSMISSION OF AIDS (Feb. 2002), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/publications/pub_factsheet_mtct_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 32. Id.  The other mode of transmission from mother to child is breastfeeding which accounts for 
about 33 percent of all MTCTs.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Heywood, Current Developments, supra note 20, at 285. 
 35. Id.  Prior to the testing of Nevirapine, the drug of choice for preventing MTCT was AZT.  
While effective in reducing MTCT, AZT required a much more complicated regimen, beginning earlier 
in a women’s pregnancy.  Id. at 279–80, 285.  The government’s strong opposition to AZT’s use in the 
prevention of MTCT led to activists focusing on Nevirapine as the drug of choice for the prevention of 
MTCT in South Africa. Id. at 282, 285. 
 36. UNAIDS, FACT SHEET, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON HIV/AIDS: GLOBAL CRISIS – 
GLOBAL ACTION 26 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/ungassfact 
sheets/pdf/allfactsheets_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 37. Heywood, Current Developments, supra note 20, at 285–86. 
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intra-partum transmission’ on April 18, 2001.38  Even after the registration 
of Nevirapine, the government refused to release the drug to public hospi-
tals beyond two pilot sites in each province.39 
The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)—a group committed to en-
suring access to HIV/AIDS medication to South Africans—brought suit 
against the Minister of Health in the Pretoria High Court in August 2001.40  
The TAC sued to combat the government’s refusal to generally distribute 
Nevirapine, despite its proven effectiveness in reducing MTCT, at public 
hospitals where testing and counseling was available.41  Leading up to the 
court filing in Pretoria, the TAC had repeatedly requested that the govern-
ment expand its program to prevent MTCT of HIV.42  In 1999 the govern-
ment, concerned with the “safety and efficacy of Nevirapine,” responded 
that it could not at the time accelerate its plan to prevent MTCT.43  Nearly a 
year later, the Minister of Health announced a plan that failed to provide 
for general distribution of Nevirapine, instead limiting its distribution to 
two test sites per province.44 
The result of this decision was that in public health facilities that were 
not chosen as pilot sites—which amounted to facilities that oversaw 90 per-
cent of the public sector births—even where counseling and testing was 
available, mothers were being denied Nevirapine because these facilities 
were prohibited from distributing it.45  By contrast any private health facil-
ity was allowed to prescribe and dispense Nevirapine.46  Given that only 19 
percent of South Africans carry full private health coverage, and that those 
without such coverage are far more likely to seek care in public facilities,47 
the government’s plan had the effect of excluding a large majority of 
women and newborns from access to Nevirapine during the birthing proc-
ess. 
The Pretoria High Court issued an order requiring the government to 
more widely distribute Nevirapine and to implement a nation-wide program 
 
 38. Id. at 289.  Notably, registration had first been recommended on November 24, 2000.  Id. 
 39. See id. at 290–291. 
 40. Though there were other plaintiffs involved in the suit, the main party was the TAC.  Minister 
of Health v. TAC, 2002 (5) SALR at 728.  More information about the TAC can be found at 
http://www.tac.org.za. 
 41. Minister of Health v. TAC, 2002 (5) SALR at 728. 
 42. Id. at 731. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  See also Heywood, Current Developments, supra note 20, at 285–286 (detailing political 
responses to government plan for limited testing of Nevirapine at pilot sites). 
 45. See Minister of Health v. TAC, 2002 (5) SALR at 734, 746. 
 46. Id. at 734. 
 47. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
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for preventing MTCT.48  The government appealed this ruling to the Con-
stitutional Court citing a concern that the “judgement could have far-
reaching implications in defining our constitutional democracy and in shap-
ing the State’s responsibility for the delivery of social services.”49  Relying 
on the South African Constitution’s protection of socio-economic rights, 
the Constitutional Court found the government’s limitation on the distribu-
tion of Nevirapine unreasonable.50  It additionally charged the government 
with developing and implementing a “comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme to realise progressively the right of pregnant women and their 
newborn children to have access to health services to combat mother-to-
child transmission of HIV.”51 
The most immediate effect of the Constitutional Court’s ruling was to 
release the restriction on public health facilities’ abilities to prescribe Nevi-
rapine for the prevention of MTCT of HIV.  In a statement issued on the 
same day as the Court’s judgment, the Minister of Health indicated that the 
“Government welcome[d] the fact that the protracted court case on the pro-
vision of Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of 
HIV ha[d] come to a conclusion.”52  The government “accept[ed] the ruling 
of the court on this matter.”53  Additionally, the Minister announced that 
 
 48. Minister of Health v. TAC, 2002 (5) SALR at 730. 
 49. Press Release, MINISTER OF HEALTH, Response Of Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, Minister 
Of Health, And MECs To Judgment On Nevirapine (Dec. 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/011220246p1006.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) 
 50. Minister of Health v. TAC, 2002 (5) SALR at 764–65.  The constitutional provisions relied 
upon were sections 7(2) and 8(1) which provide: 
7(2) The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
. . . . 
8(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the Legislature, the Executive, the Judici-
ary and all organs of State. 
Id. at 729 (quoting S. Afr. Const. ss 7, 8).  The Bill of Rights provisions that provide for the socio-
economic rights at question in this case were: 
27(1) Everyone has the right to have access to— 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
. . . . 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available re-
sources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
. . . . 
28(1) Every child has the right— 
. . . . 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services. 
Id. (quoting S. Afr. Const. ss. 27, 28 (Bill of Rights)). 
 51. Id. at 764. 
 52. Press Release, MINISTER OF HEALTH, Statement on Constitutional Court Judgment on PMTCT 
(July 5, 2002), available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02070811461006.htm (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2005). 
 53. Id. 
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the “government will implement the temporary ruling of the Constitutional 
Court on provision of Nevirapine beyond the designated sites, on the basis 
of a determination by relevant health authorities regarding the existence of 
appropriate capacity . . . .”54 By October 2002, four of South Africa’s nine 
provinces had expanded the distribution of Nevirapine beyond the test 
sites.55  Though by August 2003 four provincial governments had signed on 
with Boehringer Ingelheim to receive Nevirapine free as part of the com-
pany’s donation program, the national government had yet to accept the 
donations as of August 2003.56 
Unclear at the close of the case was when the South African govern-
ment could and would implement a national PMTCT program.  In an up-
dated Cabinet Statement in October 2002, the government made a vague 
statement regarding its plan for a national program.57  The Statement identi-
fied “the most critical challenges” as “training, budget, proper health facili-
ties and community attitudes,” and reported that “training has started in all 
provinces.”58  Additionally, the government “continue[d] to upgrade health 
facilities for testing, counselling and monitoring” and promised that 
“[f]unds will be made available for the roll-out.”59  No specific information 
about how the government planned to combat these challenges was in-
cluded in the Statement. 
An Associated Press series published in December 2004 raised new 
questions about the demonstrated safety and efficacy of Nevirapine.60  Two 
of the stories raised concerns about the protocols followed during a Nevi-
rapine study conducted by the National Institutes of Health (US) in Uganda 
from 1997 to 1999.61  These stories alleged that potentially serious side ef-
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Government Communication and Information System, Update on Cabinet’s Statement of 17 
April 2002 on fighting HIV/AIDS (October 9, 2002) [hereinafter Updated Statement], available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02101011461001.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). 
 56. See Press Release, BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM, Forty-four Countries Have Taken Up Boehringer 
Ingelheim’s Viramune Donation (August 6, 2003), available at http://www.boehringer-
ingelheim.com/corporate/asp/news/ndetail.asp?ID=1054 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
 57. Updated Statement, supra note 55. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Associated Press, Woman Died During AIDS Drug Study, Dec.16, 2004, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6721861 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005); Associated Press, Govn’t MD 
Doctored AIDS Drug Study, Dec. 14, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2004/12/13/world/main660803.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2005); Associated Press, Officials Hid 
AIDS Drug Dangers, Dec. 13, 2004, available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/14/ 
world/main661117.shtml (last visited Jan 28, 2005). 
 61. Govn’t MD Doctored AIDS Drug, supra note 60; Officials Hid AIDS Drug Dangers, supra 
note 60. 
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fects of Nevirapine, including death, were covered up in the Ugandan study 
to prevent from derailing President Bush’s 2002 announcement of a $500 
million aimed at preventing MTCT in Africa.62  The stories also argued that 
a closer review of the Ugandan research revealed “that even single doses of 
Nevirapine can create instant resistance.”63  A third article discussed the 
August 2003 death of a Tennessee woman who died from a liver disease 
likely related to long-course Nevirapine.64 
AIDS activists fear that these articles will unnecessarily derail MTCT 
programs that rely on single-dose Nevirapine.65  The African National 
Congress (ANC), the ruling political party in South Africa and the party to 
which President Mbeki belongs, has accused the United States government 
of using Africans as “guinea pigs” and of conspiring “with a pharmaceuti-
cal company to tell lies to promote the sales of [N]evirapine in Africa, with 
absolutely no consideration of the health impact of those lies on the lives of 
millions of Africans.”66  Such claims are unfounded.67  There were report-
ing problems with the Ugandan study but these problems did not under-
mine the primary conclusion of the study—that single-dose Nevirapine 
provides an effective and relatively safe option for the prevention of 
MTCT.68  These results are supported by at least seven other trials, includ-
ing one conducted in South Africa.69  The death of the woman in Tennes-
see, while tragic, bears little on the issue of safety of single-dose Nevirap-
 
 62. Officials Hid AIDS Drug Dangers, supra note 60. 
 63. Id.; Govn’t MD Doctored AIDS Drug, supra note 60. 
 64. Woman Died During AIDS Drug Study, supra note 60. 
 65. John S. James, Nevirapine Misinformation: Will it Kill?, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Dec. 2004, 
at http://www.aidsnews.org/2004/12/nevirapine-ap.html (last visited Jan.28, 2004) (“The danger now is 
that misleading [N]evirapine stories published around the world will cause patients, doctors, or even 
governments to reject single-dose [N]evirapine to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission, in cases 
when no other treatment is possible.”). 
 66. Nevirapine, drugs & African guinea pigs, 4 ANC TODAY 50, ¶ 5  (Dec 17, 2004), at 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/at50.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); See also, Donald G. 
McNeil, Jr., Furor in Africa Over Drug for Women with H.I.V., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at A6; 
 67. An excellent critique of the Associated Press stories and the sensationalized response to them 
can be found at Theo Smart, Associated Press Story Puts Antiretroviral Programmes at Risk, HIV & 
AIDS TREATMENT IN PRACTICE #38, Dec. 22, 2004, reprinted at http://www.essentialdrugs.org/ 
edrug/archive/200501/msg00001.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
 68. Id.  One story raised concerns about the sloppy reporting techniques of the study claiming that 
“NIH investigators couldn’t be sure from patient records which mothers got the drug. Instead, they had 
to use blood samples to confirm doses, the documents show.”  Officials Hid AIDS Drug Dangers, supra 
note 60. 
 69. Treatment Action Campaign, ANC Today Article is Inaccurate and Contradicts ANC and 
Government Policy, Jan. 17, 2005, at http://www.tac.org.za/ResponseToANCTodayNevirapine 
Article.htm (last visited Jan 28, 2005). 
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ine.70  The potential for liver complications for long-course Nevirapine had 
been well documented as early as 2000.71  Adequate liver-function moni-
toring likely could have prevented her death but was not provided to her by 
the study.72  Liver-related complications have not arisen from single-dose 
administration of Nevirapine.73 
Resistance-related side-effects appear to be the most credible concern 
raised by the Associated Press stories.74  At least one other clinical trial has 
raised some concern about decreased effectiveness of ARVs after the ad-
ministration of single-dose Nevirapine.75  However, such resistance has 
only been observed in a small number of women.76  Resistance-related con-
cerns are also only most relevant for those women who are in need of im-
mediate ARV treatment after receiving single-dose Nevirapine.77  Many 
women who receive single-dose Nevirapine to prevent MTCT of HIV are 
not immediately in need of continued ARV treatment.78  Resistance con-
cerns should not be a complete bar to the use of single-dose Nevirapine.79  
Rather, such concerns should be a factor taken into account when deciding 
whether to administer single-dose Nevirapine to a pregnant woman.80 
The TAC continues to push for wider distribution of Nevirapine until 
it reasonably can be replaced by more effective medication.  It recently re-
leased another statement urging the South African government to comply 
with the Constitutional Court ruling regarding access to Nevirapine.81  The 
statement reminded the South African government that single-dose Nevi-
rapine remains a safe option for the prevention of MTCT.82 
 
 70. Smart, supra note 67. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (“Earlier this year, data from a clinical study also showed that some women who took [sin-
gle-dose Nevirapine] had a less robust virologic response to subsequent antiretroviral therapy.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Statement, Treatment Action Campaign, Single-Dose Nevirapine Is Safe And Effective, But 
Government Should Switch To More Effective Regimens Wherever Possible, Dec. 15, 2004, at 
http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2004/ns15_12_2004a.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
 82. Id. 
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C. The Operational Plan 
After years of struggle with the South African government over the 
appropriate course of action to address the needs of the millions of HIV-
infected South Africans, South African AIDS activists won a potentially 
huge victory.  On November 19, 2003 the South African government an-
nounced a comprehensive and aggressive program for combating 
HIV/AIDS.  The Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, 
Management and Treatment for South Africa addresses issues from the 
planned course of action in administering ARV treatment to implementa-
tion and health care staffing plans to budget and funding priorities.83  The 
plan addresses the issue of access to ARV in several ways, including: 1) 
Setting out a timeframe for distribution; 2) setting out a national health 
standard for when ARVs will be administered both to adults and children; 
3) continuing to include Nevirapine in its plan for the PMTCT of HIV; and 
4) considering the funding and research elements necessary to achieving 
the objectives of the plan.84  Clearly, the announcement of the Operational 
Plan marked a significant change in the public attitude the government has 
displayed toward the existence of and treatment options for the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in South Africa.  Less clear is how effective the government will 
be in carrying out the Plan.  The failures of the plan in the year since it was 
first announced will be briefly discussed in the concluding portion of this 
note. 
Under the new plan the government predicted it would provide access 
to ARVs over a six-year period to 1,470,510 patients.85  The following ta-
ble shows the new patients per year to whom the government planned to 
provide ARVs under the plan: 
 
 83. See generally MINISTER OF HEALTH, OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR COMPREHENSIVE HIV AND 
AIDS CARE, MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT FOR SOUTH AFRICA (2003) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL 
PLAN]. 
 84. Id. at 68. MINISTER OF HEALTH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE HIV AND AIDS CARE, MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT FOR SOUTH AFRICA 18, 36, 
38–40, 42 (2003) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. 
 85. Id. at 42. 
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New Patients Starting ARVs 
 and Total Cumulative Numbers on ARVs86 
 
The national standard adopted by the Operational Plan for the timing 
of ARV administration is substantially similar to the guidelines suggested 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) for antiretroviral therapy (ART) 
in developing countries.87  The Plan details administration protocol for both 
adults and children.  Following the WHO recommendations for administra-
tion of ARVs in developing countries closely,88 the Operational Plan sets 
the standard for when ARVs should be administered to adults as: 
• CD4 count ≤ 200 cells/mm3 and symptomatic, irrespective of 
stage, 
or 
• WHO stage IV AIDS defining illness, irrespective of CD4 
count, 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. OPERATIONAL PLAN, supra note 83, at 63, 69. 
 88. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, SCALING UP ANTIRETROVIRAL 
TREATMENT IN LIMITED RESOURCE SETTINGS: GUIDELINES FOR A PUBLIC HEATH APPROACH 11 (2002) 
[hereinafter ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY GUIDE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/arv/en/scaling_exe_summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).  WHO rec-
ommends ARV treatment begin after any of three events occur: WHO stage IV of HIV disease (clinical 
AIDS), regardless of CD4 count; WHO Stages I, II or III of HIV disease, with a CD4 count below 
200/mm3; or, when CD4 count is unavailable, WHO Stages II or III of HIV disease with TLC (total 
lymphocyte count) below 1200/mm3.  Id.  WHO HIV stages are defined in the full version of the same 
report. WHO, SCALING UP ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY IN RESOURCE-LIMITED SETTINGS: GUIDELINES 
FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 98–100 (2002) [hereinafter ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY GUIDE], 
available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/en/ScalingUp_E.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).  
Generally, Stage I is asymptomatic, Stage II and III are characterized by weight loss and certain oppor-
tunistic infections, and the final stage, Stage IV, is characterized by HIV wasting syndrome – “weight 
loss of >10% of body weight, plus either unexplained chronic diarrhea (>1 month) or chronic weakness 
and unexplained prolonged fever (>1 month)” or other more serious opportunistic infections, such as 
Kaposi’s sarcoma or Lymphoma, which are often considered AIDS defining.  Id. at 98–99. 
New Cases Starting 
       Year                                 ARVs                         Total Cases on ARVs 
 
2003/04 53,000 53,000 
2004/05 138,315 188,665 
2005/06 215,689 381,177 
2006/07 299,516 645,740 
2007/08 411,889 1,001,534 
2008/09 551,089 1,470,510 
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and 
•  Patient prepared and ready to take ARVs adherently.89 
Again, following pediatric WHO recommendations,90 for children under six 
years of age, the Operational Plan calls for treatment when: 
• CD4 percentage < 15% and symptomatic, 
or 
• WHO Pediatric Stage III AIDS defining illness, irrespective of 
CD4 percentage, 
and 
•  At least one responsible person capable of administering the 
child’s medication.91 
The Operational Plan additionally takes into account the need for regular 
testing to determine when, based on CD4 counts, a patient should being 
ARV treatment.92  The Plan sets up guidelines for when and how frequently 
testing should occur based on a patient’s last CD4 count.93 
The Operational Plan also addresses the continued goal of PMTCT 
and treatment guidelines for HIV-infected pregnant women.94  It not only 
confirms the continued use of single-dose Nevirapine during labor for HIV-
infected women and their babies, but it also sets guidelines for when full 
course ART should be administered during pregnancy.95  The guidelines 
make any pregnant woman after her first trimester eligible for ART if her 
CD4 count drops below 200.96  Additionally, the Operational Plan makes 
strong recommendations that ART eligibility be extended to “pregnant 
women with CD4 counts between 200 and 350. . . after the first trimester, 
with therapy to be continued for life.”97 
 
 89. OPERATIONAL PLAN, supra note 83, at 63. 
 90. WHO recommends that ARVs be administered for children over 18 months if “they have 
WHO Stage III HIV disease (i.e. clinical AIDS) regardless of CD4 percentage” or, for children with 
WHO stage I or II HIV disease, ART is recommended if the CD4 percentage is < 15%.  
ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY GUIDE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 88, at 11.  WHO defines three 
clinical stages for children.  ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY GUIDE, supra note 88, at 100.  Stage I is as-
ymptomatic, Stage II is characterized by symptoms such as persistent fever and recurrent bacterial in-
fections, Stage III is characterized by AIDS defining opportunistic infections or more severe symptoms 
then those in Stage II such as severe failure to thrive or malignancy.  Id. 
 91. OPERATIONAL PLAN, supra note 83, at 69. 
 92. Id. at 65–66. 
 93. Id. at 66. 
 94. Id. at 68. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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Funding the Operational Plan is a huge challenge that has been ad-
dressed as well.  Though a large factor in determining cost and success of 
the program is the future ability of the government to secure ARVs inex-
pensively, which will be discussed further in Part III, other funding needs 
are recognized in the Operational Plan and bear mention here.  The Plan in-
cludes five-year budget estimates for expenses such as ARV drugs, health-
care staff, health system upgrades including development and support of 
new drug distribution methods, testing, and research.98  It allocates R42 
million (Rand, which is approximately US$6.36 million) to ARVs in the 
first year and about R1.6 billion (US$242 million) over five years.99  The 
entire program costs are estimated at nearly R12 billion (US$1.82 billion) 
for five years.100 
III.  THE NEXT STEP: SECURING AFFORDABLE ARVS 
South Africa now has in place a comprehensive national plan for the 
prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, which includes a plan to distribute 
ARVs widely over the next five years and which in many respects repre-
sents a complete reversal of the position of the South African government 
less than four years ago.  However, a large question remains as to whether 
the government will be able to procure ARVs to cover all of those it has 
planned to at a cost it can afford. 
As of May 2003 the cheapest price for yearly treatment per person of 
WHO recommended Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART), a 
treatment that combines three types of ARVs, was US$675 for a brand 
name treatment or $300 for generic treatment.101  Though these prices rep-
resent a significant drop from prices only a few years ago, they still repre-
sent a significant cost for the South African government in implementing 
its Operational Plan.102  Based on the budget and ARVs coverage informa-
tion provided in the Operational Plan, the government planned to spend 
from R792 (US$119) in the first year of the program to R1956 (US$296) in 
 
 98. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 84, at 36–37. 
 99. Id.  All conversions from Rand to US dollars are based on the conversion rates applicable on 
November 19, 2003, the date of the release of the Operational Plan.  The conversion rate use is avail-
able at http://www.xe.com/ict/ (select US dollars under “based on this currency. . .” heading and No-
vember 19, 2003 under “as of this date. . .” heading) (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
 100. See id. at 37. 
 101. UNAIDS, FACT SHEET, ACCESS TO HIV TREATMENT AND CARE (November 15, 2003). 
 102. See id. (stating that “[e]ven with greatly reduced drug prices, in low-income countries with 
high AIDS prevalence, significant external financing is needed to provide antiretrovirals to all those in 
need.”).  “In early 2000, the price of [HAART] for one patient for a year was US$10,000–US$12,000. 
By the end of 2000, prices had dropped to US$500–US$800 per person per year for first-line antiretro-
viral treatment in low-income countries.” Id. 
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the second year of the program per person per year on ARVs.103  For the 
projections of the Operation Plan to be realized the South African govern-
ment must develop and implement a strategy that addresses the need to 
procure affordable ARVs.  To do this it will need to rely on both interna-
tional agreements that allow access to generic substitutions for brand name 
ARVs and access in certain settings for patented drugs at heavily dis-
counted prices, as well as on its own patent and prescription drug laws. 
A. International Agreements 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)104 was created in 1994 and took effect 
on January 1, 1995. 105  The agreement extensively covers intellectual prop-
erty rights, including patent rights for pharmaceuticals.  Patent law protec-
tion affords a patent holder the exclusive rights over the patented good or 
process for a set period of time.106  The general theory behind patent pro-
tection is that such protection allows for a monopoly period during which 
the patent holder can recover research and development (R&D) costs.107  
This monopoly period, in theory, provides an incentive for future invest-
ment into R&D with the promise of potential profit after costs have been 
recovered.108 
Developed countries were given one year from the date of effective-
ness of TRIPS, until January 1, 1996, to comply with the terms of the 
agreement.109  Developing WTO member countries were given until Janu-
ary 2000 to comply generally with patent provisions of the agreement.110  
Developing countries that, unlike South Africa, had no previous patent law 
covering areas such as pharmaceuticals, were given until 2005 to extend 
 
 103. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 84, at 37, 42.  The highest amount per person allocated 
in any given year for ARV spending in is the second year of the program.  After the second year, allo-
cated spending per person slowly declines from R1956 (US$296) to R1647 (US$249) in the fifth year.  
See id. 
 104. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, December 15, 1993, 33 
I.L.M 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 105. See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights & 
Development Policy, 3 (2002). 
 106. Id. at 14.  See also Susan Cleary & Don Ross, The 1998 Legal Struggle between the South 
African Government and the International Pharmaceutical Industry: A Game-Theory Analysis, 27 J. 
SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 445, 448 (2002) (describing the patent protection afforded under the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 107. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 105, at 14. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id at 3. 
 110. Id. 
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their patent law to the areas protected under TRIPS.111  South Africa agreed 
to the provisions of TRIPS and adopted compliance with TRIPS into its 
own laws in 1997.112  Patents are covered by the TRIPS agreement in Arti-
cles 27–34.  TRIPS provides for a minimum term of protection of 20 
years,113 during which time the subject of a patent is protected from use, 
sale or import without the patent owner’s consent.114 
For South Africa’s next step in securing affordable ARVs, the two 
most important international legal concepts to focus on are parallel import-
ing and compulsory licensing.115  While both of these concepts are ad-
dressed in TRIPS, they rely on domestic laws for definition.116  The relation 
of these concepts to South African domestic law will be discussed later in 
the note. 
Parallel importing occurs when goods “are purchased in a foreign 
market by an independent third party and [then] later resold in the domestic 
market where their much lower prices compete with those of authorized 
distributors.”117  It is addressed by Article 6 of TRIPS which states that 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaus-
tion of intellectual property rights.”118  The “issue of exhaustion of rights” 
in Article 6 refers to the right of resale.119  Under some domestic patent 
laws, patent protection only extends to the first sale and not to any subse-
quent resale of goods by a party other than the patent holder, allowing for 
 
 111. TRIPS, supra note 104, art. 65, para. 4 (“To the extent that a developing country Member is 
obliged by this Agreement to extend product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable 
in its territory on the general date of application of this Agreement for that Member, as defined in para-
graph 2 above, it may delay the application of the provisions on product patents of Section 5 of Part 
II. . .to such areas of technology for an additional period of five years.”  South Africa, by contrast, had 
in place an extensive patent protection scheme, which included the protection for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, at the time of the creation of TRIPS in 1994.  See Patent Act 57 of 1978, Ch. 5, Art. 25 (S. Afr.) 
(stating that “a patent may. . .be granted for any new invention which involves an inventive step and 
which is capable of being used or applied in trade or industry or agriculture”). 
 112. Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997 (S. Afr.). 
 113. TRIPS, supra note 104, art. 33. 
 114. Id. at art. 28; see also, Alan O. Sykes, Public Health and International Law: TRIPS, Pharma-
ceuticals, Developing Countries and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 50–53 (2002) (discuss-
ing pertinent TRIPS provisions). 
 115. See Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 447–49 (2002) (defining parallel importing and com-
pulsory licensing and their allowed functions under TRIPS). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Duane Nash, South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substance Control Amendment of 1997, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 490 (2000). 
 118. TRIPS, supra note 104, art. 6. 
 119. Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 448 
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the possibility of parallel importing.120  TRIPS leaves the decision about the 
legality of parallel importing to the discretion of domestic patent laws.121 
Provisions for compulsory licensing are provided for by Article 31 of 
the TRIPS agreement.  Article 31 sets out an allowed exception to a patent 
holder’s exclusive rights over the patented good, which can be provided for 
under domestic law. 122  The exception allows for the good to be licensed 
for use “without the authorization of the right holder,” in certain defined 
situations.123  Domestic law can allow use of a patented good without au-
thorization when authorization has been sought on “reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions” and has been refused “within a reasonable period of 
time.”124  The requirement for authorization can be waived altogether in 
light of a “national emergency. . . or in cases of public non-commercial 
use.”125  The conditions on use set forth in Article 31 are not applicable if 
“such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive.”126 
Article 31 originally required that all use, except in cases to correct 
anti-competitive behavior, be “authorized predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”127  In countries 
with little or no manufacturing ability, TRIPS’ allowance for compulsory 
licensing therefore had little value.128  A recent amendment to the agree-
ment, however, recognized this problem and instructed the Council for 
TRIPS to find and report on an “expeditious solution to this problem” be-
fore the end of 2002.129  One proposal put forth in response to Paragraph 6 
of the Doha Declaration would make it possible under TRIPS for a country 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Nash, supra note 117, at 490 (“TRIPS avoids mandating worldwide norms on the legality 
of parallel importation”). 
 122. TRIPS, supra note 104, art. 31. 
 123. Id.  It is an important clarification that Article 31, and compulsory licensing in general, only 
refers to an allowance of another to make the good in question.  There are no provisions included in 
TRIPS that require the patent holder to forcibly produce or provide the good in question under the com-
pulsory license.  See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 105, at 44–45. 
 124. TRIPS, supra note 104, art. 31(b). 
 125. Id.  See also World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC//2 (Nov. 14, 2001) at Para. 5(c) [hereinafter “Doha Declaration] 
(stating that it is “understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS. . .can rep-
resent a national emergency” for the purposes of Article 31of TRIPS). 
 126. Id. art. 31(k). 
 127. See id. art. 31(f), 31(k). 
 128. See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 105, at 44–46 (“The practical ef-
fect of this provision is to render the compulsory licensing provisions practically worthless for the very 
countries which are likely to need it most”). 
 129. Doha Declaration, supra note 125, para. 6. 
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who qualifies for compulsory licensing to export a portion of pharmaceuti-
cals produced under a compulsory license to another country in need of the 
medicines. 130  This proposal presumes that the importing country does not 
have the manufacturing ability to produce the drugs.131  It also appears to 
rely on the exportation of only a portion of the compulsory-licensed phar-
maceuticals so as not to violate Art. 31(f) of TRIPS.132 
B. Domestic Law 
1997 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, 
which took effect in May 2003, added this contentious portion to the 1965 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act: 
   
15C. Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines. 
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the pub-
lic, and in particular may— 
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 
1978 (Act 57 of 1978), determine that the rights with regard to any 
medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts 
in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market by the 
owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent; 
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in 
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the 
same proprietary name as that of another medicine already registered in 
the Republic, but which is imported by a person other than the person 
who is the holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already 
registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the 
original manufacturer as approved by the council in the prescribed man-
ner, may be imported; 
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the 
medicine referred to in paragraph (b).133 
 
The introduction of the Medicines Amendment Act invited interna-
tional criticism and action against the South African government from such 
players as the United States government and large pharmaceutical compa-
nies, as well as domestically from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ As-
 
 130. See, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 105, at 48. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (arguing that “a proportion of the supplies manufactured could be offered for export to 
countries in need. . .”); see also, TRIPS, supra note 104, Art. 31(f). 
 133. Section 10 of Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (S. Afr.) 
[hereinafter Medicines Amendment Act] (referring back to §15C of  Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act 101 of 1965 [hereinafter Medicines Act]). 
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sociation of South Africa (PMA).134  The debate centered around whether 
the South African government would use its powers under this amendment 
to circumvent patent protections provided both under TRIPS and domestic 
patent laws.135  The United States responded to the amendment by threaten-
ing the South African government with economic sanctions if it insisted on 
allowing the amendment to enter into force.136  The U.S. government 
agreed to remove this threat in 1999 however when South Africa “affirmed 
the Act’s validity under international law and alleged that the United States 
was pressuring South Africa simply to protect American pharmaceutical 
interests.”137  In a press statement announcing the agreement between the 
United States and South Africa, the South African government asserted its 
ability to use compulsory licensing and parallel importing under provision 
15C provided for by the Medicines Amendment Act, while at the same 
time promising to “hon[or] its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.”138  
Indeed, as previously mentioned, TRIPS allows for parallel importing and, 
with certain restrictions, for compulsory licensing as well. 
What concerned the major international pharmaceutical companies 
and the PMA was the lack of constraints placed on the Minister of Health 
to protect patent interests in the process of procuring affordable medi-
cines.139  PMA argued that section 15C “could be used to justify and sanc-
tion both parallel importation and compulsory licensing of certain medi-
cines” without also providing the TRIPS safeguards for the protection of 
the patent holder.140  In February 1998, the PMA and 42 pharmaceutical 
companies (this number later dropped to 39) filed a suit against the South 
African government in the Pretoria High Court, claiming that section 15C 
violated the South African Patents Act and South Africa’s TRIPS obliga-
tions.141  As the case became associated with the struggle for access to 
HIV/AIDS medications in the popular press, the PMA and the pharmaceu-
 
 134. See Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 450–57 (providing overview of the international legal 
dispute that arose as a result of the introduction of the Medicines Amendment Act).  See generally, 
Heywood, Debunking ‘Conglomo-talk’, supra note 11 (detailing the international lobbying against the 
Act by the PMA and the resulting legal action). 
 135. See Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 451–52. 
 136. Nash, supra note 117, at 486–87. 
 137. Id. at 487; Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 454. 
 138. Department of Trade and Industry, A Joint Understanding between the Governments of South 
Africa and the United States of America (September 17, 1999), available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/pr/1999/pr0917b.html?rebookmark=1 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2005). 
 139. Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 451. 
 140. Id. at 451–52. 
 141. Id. (quoting PMA’s Notice of Motion in the court case). 
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tical companies drew world-wide criticism for their position in the law-
suit.142  After the announcement of an agreement between the United States 
and South Africa, the PMA announced it would settle its case out of 
court.143  But, about a year later, the PMA withdrew from settlement talks 
and prepared to return to court.144  Then, in April 2001, one month after the 
TAC had entered the case on the side of the government, the PMA again 
dropped the suit.145 
When the South African government announced draft regulations to 
amend the Medicines Act after the settlement with PMA and removed any 
suggestion of the right to compulsory licensing in that draft, there was 
some question as to whether the South African government had privately 
conceded the issue of compulsory licensing to the PMA.146  However, these 
regulations seem not to have taken effect and currently the Medicines 
Amendment Act of 1997 remains in force.147  Given the current state of the 
law, and the end of international opposition to it, the South African gov-
ernment, at least for now, is in a position to implement parallel importing 
and/or compulsory licensing in its quest to find affordable ARVs to fulfill 
its promises under the Operational Plan. 
Because the 1997 Medicines Amendment Act allows the Minister of 
Health great discretion in determining the appropriate rights of a patent 
holder in light of a need to supply affordable medications, 148 the Act may 
also allow for generic substitution of name brand ARVs.  Generally, ge-
neric substitution “entails prescribing a generic drug once the patent has 
expired on the brand name drug as long as the generic is cheaper.”149  This 
definition then would seem to rule out generic substitutions for any drugs 
that are currently patented in South Africa.  At least 13 of 15 common 
ARVs are patented in South Africa—more than any other country on the 
continent.150  Given this fact, the government will likely have to rely 
largely on compulsory licensing, rather than generic substitution, unless it 
can find generic substitutions for enough ARVs that are yet to be patented 
in South Africa.  A recent deal struck by the Clinton Foundation with four 
 
 142. Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 453. 
 143. Id. at 454. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 455; Robert Block & Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Agree to Drop South African 
Suit—Bad PR Over AIDS Quells Efforts to Defend Patents; Pretoria Concedes Little, WALL ST. J., 
April 19, 2001, at A12. 
 146. See Cleary & Ross, supra note 106, at 455–56. 
 147. See Medicines Act, supra note 133, at §15C. 
 148. Clearly & Ross, supra note 106, at 450. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 105, at 35. 
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generic drug companies, including the South African company Aspen Phar-
macare Holdings Ltd, to distribute ARVs for as little as 38 cents per day, 
may be able to provide these generics.151  Before Aspen will be able to ef-
fectively supply the drugs to South Africa, the government will have to find 
more of the company’s drugs to be safe and approve them for use in treat-
ing HIV disease.152 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE ON-GOING STRUGGLE 
In early 2002, then National Secretary of the TAC, Mark Heywood 
commented that South Africa “need[ed] a comprehensive national treat-
ment plan, and that [was] not yet something that [was] being seriously en-
tertained.”153  In late 2003 the Operational Plan represented a promising 
and dramatically quick turn-about in the South African government’s posi-
tion on the AIDS crisis, particularly on the issue of access to and supply of 
ARVs.  After a prolonged battle with the government, AIDS activists had 
won a crucial battle in securing ARVs for South Africans. 
The next step is to ensure that safe and affordable ARVs are available 
under the new plan.  Unfortunately the results in achieving this goal have 
been mixed at best.  The government did not begin the formal drug pro-
curement process until February 2004, three months after it initiated the 
Operational Plan.154 As of January 2005, drug procurement contracts for 
the desperately needed ARVs still had not been awarded.155 Also notable is 
the government’s significant reduction in the planned budget for the first 
year of the Plan’s implementation.  An announcement by the government 
that it reduced the first-year budget from R296 million to R90 million coin-
cided with the beginning of the formal drug procurement process.156  Al-
though the Operational Plan set the goal of 53,000 new patients on ARVs 
in its first year, to date only 13,000 to 15,000 patients have received ARV 
treatment under the Plan.157 
 
 151. Mark Schoofs, South Africa Reverses Course on AIDS Drugs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003, at 
B1. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Ann M. Simmons, Dissent Is Growing Over AIDS Policies; Health: Doctors, clergy and most 
provinces defy the South African government’s limited use of drugs to fight the growing epidemic, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A5. 
 154. TAC, Updated First Report on the Implementation of the Operational Plan for Comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS Case, Management and Treatment for South Africa (Operational Plan), 8 (July 2004). 
 155. E-mail from Fatima Hassan, Attorney, Law & Treatment Access Unit, AIDS Law Project, to 
Mary Beth Walker (Feb. 3, 2005 04:39:56 EST) (on file with journal). 
 156. Nicol Degli Innocenti and James Lamont, South Africa slashes Aids Budget by two-thirds, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at 11. 
 157. Id. 
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In order to successfully address the ever increasing AIDS epidemic in 
South Africa, the government must move toward reaching the goals set out 
in the Operational Plan.  Recently, the TAC returned to the South African 
courts to demand answers to the government’s slow implementation of the 
Operational Plan.158  It demanded that the government explain its imple-
mentation timetable, increase the availability of ARVs, and expand the 
public health system over the next five years.159  When the Operational 
Plan was originally released it referenced two annexes that apparently were 
to have set out a timetable for implementation of the plan.160  When the 
TAC’s requests for production of those annexes were repeatedly ignored, 
the TAC returned to court to force the government to produce the imple-
mentation timetables.161  Unfortunately, the litigation revealed that no such 
timetables existed.  Reference to them in the Operational plan was included 
by mistake.162  So, while the Operational Plan seemed a promising shift in 
the government’s position on the treatment of HIV/AIDS when it was first 
released, the year since its release has demonstrated the ongoing battle for 
HIV-infected South Africans to receive adequate access to ARV treatment.  
The TAC and millions of HIV-infected South Africans continue to wait for 
the government to implement a comprehensive plan to combat the AIDS 
crisis in South Africa. 
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